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indicated such an intention.14  Therefore, the arrangement was
not an eligible participant in a like-kind exchange because it
was deemed to be a partnership rather than a mere co-
ownership of property.15
Other authority
But is the 1997 private letter ruling,16 with its singular
emphasis on filing a federal income tax return, consistent with
other authority?
A 1975 revenue ruling, Rev. Rul. 75-374,17 also involved the
question of whether the co-owners of real property, in this case
an apartment project, should be treated as a partnership for
federal income tax purposes.  Citing the regulations,18 the
ruling notes that mere co-ownership of property that is
maintained, kept in repair and rented to others did not
constitute a partnership.19  The ruling further states that tenants
in common may be treated as partners if they actively carry on
a trade, business, financial operation or venture, and divide the
profits from the arrangement.20  The ruling concludes that the
two owners, one an insurance company and the other an
investment trust, were to be treated as co-owners and not as
partners.21  The ruling explained that the furnishing of
customary services in connection with the maintenance and
repair of an apartment project would not transform a co-
ownership arrangement into a partnership but the furnishing of
additional services would render a co-ownership a partnership
if the additional services are furnished directly by the co-
owners or through their agent.22  The ruling observed that, in
the facts of the ruling, the co-owners were not furnishing the
additional services either directly or through an agent—an
unrelated corporation was responsible for managing the
project.23
Lessons to be learned
The conclusion of the 1997 private letter ruling is worrisome
for many farm and ranch exchanges involving co-ownership of
property.  The ruling identifies four key factors—(1) there was
co-ownership of property; (2) management services exceeded
“customary” services for maintenance and repair; (3) the
additional services were by the co-owners or by an agent; and
(4) the co-owners filed a partnership income tax return.
In a typical co-ownership of farmland rented under a crop-
share or livestock share lease, the lease is not ordinarily
considered to be a partnership24 but the involvement in
management often exceeds the customary management level, at
least compared to a cash rent lease and the involvement is often
by the co-owners themselves or by a farm manager as agent.
Thus, if the co-owners file a federal partnership income tax
return (which many do as a matter of convenience), like-kind
exchange treatment may be in jeopardy.
Therefore, in instances where a like-kind exchange is
contemplated, it is important not to file a Form 1065,
partnership income tax return.25  A shift to a cash rent lease
would not appear to be necessary but it would be advisable to
keep management activities to the “customary” level for the
years preceding the exchange.
FOOTNOTES
1 See generally 4 Harl, Agricultural Law § 27.03[8][a][ii]
(1999); Harl, Agricultural Law Manual § 4.02[16] (1999).
2 See Harl, “What Is Like-Kind,” 9 Agric. L. Dig. 149 (1998).
3 Ltr. Rul. 9741017, July 10, 1997.
4 I.R.C. § 1031(a)(1).
5 I.R.C. § 1031(a)(2)(D).
6 Id.
7 See I.R.C. § 1031(a)(1).




12 See I.R.C. § 1031(a)(2)(D).
13 Ltr. Rul. 9741017, July 10, 1997.
14 Id.
15 Id.
16 Ltr. Rul. 9741017, July 10, 1997.
17 1974-2 C.B. 261.
18 Treas. Reg. § 1.761-1(a).
19 Rev. Rul. 75-374, 1975-2 C.B. 261.
20 Id.
21 Id.
22 See Harl, Agricultural Law § 41.06 (1999) (imputation of
activities by agent to property owner as principal).
23 Id.
24 See Ltr. Rul. 9922014, Feb. 12, 1999.
25 Id.
CASES, REGULATIONS AND STATUTES
by Robert P. Achenbach, Jr.
BANKRUPTCY
CHAPTER 13   -ALM § 13.03.*
ELIGIBILITY . The debtors, husband and wife, originally
filed for Chapter 13 but both debtors died before filing a plan.
The debtors claimed their 140 acre residence as an exempt rural
homestead. The debtor’s attorney filed a motion to convert the
case to Chapter 7, which the court originally granted. On
reconsideration, the court vacated the conversion of the case,
holding that the decedent’s estate could not convert a case to
Chapter 7 because the estate could not file for Chapter 7. The
court emphasized that the estate could not be a debtor because
the estate did not have income to fund the plan. The court also
dismissed the Chapter 13 case on the grounds that the estate
would be better administered in state probate court to give the
creditors the best payment on their claims. In re Spiser, 232
B.R. 669 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1999).
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FEDERAL TAXATION     -ALM § 13.03[7].*
AUTOMATIC STAY. On the date of the bankruptcy petition
filing, the debtor owned a contingent interest in a trust for the
debtor’s parent. After the petition, the parent died and some of
the trust property passed to the debtor. The IRS had filed a pre-
petition tax lien which the parties agreed attached to the
contingent interest of the debtor in the trust property. The IRS
argued that the lien also attached to the trust property that
vested in the debtor post-petition. The debtor argued, and the
court agreed, that the automatic stay, under Section 362(a)(5),
prevented the attachment and perfection of the tax lien to the
vested interest which arose post-petition. Therefore, the IRS tax
claim was secured only to the extent of the value of the debtor’s
pre-petition contingent interest in the trust. In re Avis, 99-2
U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶ 50,632 (4th Cir. 1999).
CLAIM. The debtor owned an interest in a 401(k) retirement
plan which was subject to a federal tax lien. The issue was
whether the value of the debtor’s interest in the plan was the
full face value of the interest or was reduced by the amount of
early withdrawal penalties. The court held that the tax costs of
withdrawal of the 401(k) funds did not decrease the value of the
property for bankruptcy purposes in determining the secured
portion of a claim. The court held that the value of property was
to be its replacement value; therefore, the value of the 401(k)
interest was the amount of money needed to acquire a similar
interest. Since there would be no tax resulting from the
acquisition of another 401(k) interest, the value of the interest
was not reduced by any tax consequences. Le dy v. Comm’r,
99-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶ 50,617 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1999).
DISCHARGE. The debtor failed to file returns for 1985-
1987 and 1989. The IRS constructed substitute returns and
made assessments based on those returns. In 1994, in response
to an IRS amnesty program, the debtor filed the returns for
those years using the figures supplied by the IRS in its
assessments. The debtor filed for bankruptcy in 1997 and
sought discharge of the 1985-87 taxes. The IRS argued that the
1994-filed returns could not be considered returns for purposes
of Section 523 because the debtor’s returns served no purpose
since the returns reflected only the IRS calculations. The court
rejected this argument because Section 523 had no provision for
returns filed after substitute returns are constructed. The court
held that the returns were sufficient for Section 523 and also
held that the forms were filed in good faith because they were
prepared by professional preparers and filed in order to take
advantage of the amnesty program. In re Nunez, 232 B.R. 778
(Bankr. 9th Cir. 1999).
CONTRACTS
LIMITATION OF WARRANTY . The plaintiff was a
tobacco farmer who purchased tobacco seed from the
defendant. Only about 15 percent of the seeds germinated,
resulting in substantial loss of crop. At the time of purchase, the
parties did not discuss any limitation of the defendant’s liability
for defective seeds. The label on the seed packages limited the
defendant’s liability to the purchase price of the seeds but the
plaintiff sued for the loss of profit on a normal crop, arguing
that the warranty limitation was void as unconscionable. The
court discussed the unique aspect of seeds and farming which
made warranty limitation clauses unconscionable: (1) the
product was not subject to repair, (2) the farmer had to invest
significant economic and labor before discovering the defect in
the seeds, (3) the recovery of the purchase price was
significantly less than the potential economic losses, (4) the
farmer rarely is in any position to bargain over the warranty
provisions, (5) the manufacturer was better able to spread the
risk of loss than the farmer, and the manufacturer has better
resources for testing the product before sale and use. The court
identified several cases supporting its holding that the warranty
limitations clause was void as unconscionable. Mullis v.
Speight Seed Farms, Inc., 505 S.E.2d 818 (Ga. Ct. App.
1998).
REQUIREMENTS CONTRACTS . The debtor was a dairy
which had won a contract to supply a school district with all of
its milk needs during the school year. The debtor filed for
bankruptcy and the trustee sought to recover contract payment
from the school district. The school district alleged that the
dairy breached the requirements contract in that the dairy
stopped delivering milk when it filed for bankruptcy. The
district claimed that the contract required the dairy to provide
all the milk for the entire school year. The court held that, in
order for the diary to be required to supply all the milk, the
district had to be required to purchase all the milk from the
dairy. The court found that no contract provision required the
district to purchase any milk from the dairy but only governed
the price paid for milk which was purchased by the district;
therefore, the dairy did not breach any requirement to deliver
and the district had to pay the bankruptcy estate for the milk
delivered before the bankruptcy filing. In re Modern Dairy of
Champaign, Inc., 171 F. 3d 1106 (7th Cir. 1999).
FEDERAL AGRICULTURAL
PROGRAMS
BRUCELLOSIS . The APHIS has issued interim regulations
amending the brucellosis regulations concerning the interstate
movement of cattle by changing the classification of Kansas
from Class A to Class Free. 64 Fed. Reg. 36775 (July 8, 1999).
EGGS. The AMS is soliciting comments on its proposal to
change the United States Grade Standards for shell eggs.
Specifically, AMS proposes to delete the general term “Inedible
eggs” and its definition, revise the definition of the general term
“Loss” eggs by including examples of inedible eggs, revise the
term descriptive of an A quality white, and delete specifications
for packaging materials. 64 Fed. Reg. 34764 (June 29, 1999).
PRODUCTION FLEXIBILITY CONTRACTS . The CCC
has issued a notice of proposed regulations governing
production flexibility contracts (PFCs) for the purpose of
seeking comments on: (1) the appropriateness of the current
method of calculating PFC payment reductions as a result of a
fruit or vegetable planting violation as set forth in 7 CFR
1412.401; (2) alternative methods for calculating PFC payment
reductions for fruit or vegetable planting violations, if the
current m thod of calculation is considered inappropriate; (3)
the re roactivity of any change in the method of calculating
payme t reductions; and (4) the effect any change in the
method of calculating payment reductions should have on
PFC's which have been terminated, or for which contract
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acreage was reduced, because of the current method of
calculating payment reductions for fruit or vegetable planting
violations. 64 Fed. Reg. 34154 (June 25, 1999).
FEDERAL ESTATE
AND GIFT TAX
GENERATION-SKIPPING TRANSFERS . The taxpayer
was a beneficiary of a trust created in 1935 and held a general
power of appointment over trust assets. The taxpayer executed
a written disclaimer which reduced the power of appointment
such that the taxpayer could exercise the power only in favor of
the taxpayer’s estate and could only exercise the power only at
the taxpayer’s death. The IRS ruled that the partial disclaimer
did not subject the trust to GSTT. Ltr. Rul. 9923028, April 15,
1999.
MARITAL DEDUCTION . Under the decedent’s will, all
estate taxes were payable from the residuary bequest under the
trust that passed to the children, but the pecuniary marital share
was not burdened with any estate taxes. Almost all of the
decedent's assets were held in the trusts; therefore, the IRS
ruled that the tax payment provision in the will was inoperative,
and the tax payment directions in the trust governed the
allocation of estate taxes. The trust directed payment from
principal but did not specify any particular assets as the source
of payment. However, the trust provided that property
excludable from computing the federal estate tax was not to be
burdened with payment of estate taxes. The IRS ruled that the
marital trust assets were not to be burdened with payment of
estate taxes; therefore, the marital deduction was not decreased
by any of the estate taxes. Ltr. Rul. 9925002, March 16, 1999.
VALUATION . The decedent had received undivided
interests in two trusts, a survivor’s trust and a marital trust, in
21 ranch properties from a predeceased spouse’s estate. The
predeceased spouse’s estate claimed a marital deduction for the
marital trust as QTIP. The property in both trusts was included
in the decedent’s estate and the IRS argued that the properties
should have been aggregated for valuation purposes, making
them ineligible for any fractional interest discount. The Tax
Court disagreed with the IRS and followed its decisions in
Estate of Mellinger v. Comm’r, 122 T.C. 26 (1999) and Estate
of Nowell v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 1999-15 and the Fifth Circuit
opinion in Estate of Bonner v. U.S., 84 F.3d 196 (5th Cir. 1996)
to hold that I.R.C. § 2044 had no requirement for aggregation
of property in separate trusts for federal estate tax valuation
purposes. Estate of Lopes v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 1999-225.
The taxpayer transferred to a trust a beneficial interest in a co-
operative apartment which the taxpayer used as a residence.
The IRS ruled that the beneficial interest in the apartment was a
residence for purposes of qualifying the trust as a qualified
personal residence trust. Ltr. Rul. 9925027, March 25, 1999.
VALUATION OF STOCK . The decedent owned shares of
stock which were unregistered and their sale was restricted for
federal securities law purposes such that the stock could be sold
only under the following circumstances: (1) after the securities
are formally registered with the SEC; (2) in a private resale to a
purchaser who would also be subject to resale restrictions; or
(3) pursuant to an exemption from the securities law
restrictions. The decedent was considered an "affiliate" for
securities law purposes at the time of death and, therefore, was
subject to stringent volume limitations, disclosure and other
requirements if the decedent were to dispose of the shares
pursuant to SEC Rule 144. However, the estate was not an
affiliate and could sell the shares pursuant to SEC Rule 144(k)
without regard to such restrictions. The IRS ruled in a 1992
field service advice that the stock sale restrictions should not be
considered when valuing the stock for federal estate tax
purposes. FSA 1992-0901-2, Sept. 1, 1992.
FEDERAL INCOME
TAXATION
AUDITS. The IRS has issued a revenue procedure which
describes the method by which a taxpayer may request an early
referral of one or more unresolved issues from the Examination
or Collection Division to the Office of Appeals (Appeals).
I.R.C. § 7123 provides that the Secretary shall prescribe
procedures by which any taxpayer may request such an early
referral. Early referral is a process to resolve cases more
expeditiously through the District and Appeals offices working
together. This process is optional and may be requested by any
taxpayer. The revenue procedure also describes the method by
which a taxpayer may request early referral of one or more
unagreed issues with respect to an involuntary change in
method of accounting, employment tax, employee plans, or
exempt organizations. Rev Proc. 99-28, I.R.B. 1999-__.
CAPITAL GAINS . CCH has reported that House Ways and
Means Committee Chairman Bill Archer, R-Tex, on July 7 said
that his 1999 tax proposal will reduce the maximum capital
gains tax rate from 20% to 15% on gains from property held
more than one year. For taxpayers in the 15% ordinary income
tax bracket, the capital gains tax rate would decline from 10%
to 7.5%. The effective date for the reductions would be July 1,
1999. NEWS-FEDERAL, 99TAXDAY, 07/08/99, Item #C.1.
CHARITABLE DEDUCTION . The taxpayer conveyed a
com ercial building to a charitable organization for its fair
value. However, the taxpayer claimed a charitable deduction for
50 percent of the additional value of the building in the hands
of the organization, a so-called value-in-use. The court held that
the valuation of the building based on the donee’s use was not
proper and denied the charitable deduction. Arbor Towers
Associates, Ltd. V. Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 1999-213.
COURT AWARDS AND SETTLEMENTS . The taxpayers
filed suit for personal injuries arising out of an automobile
accident. The taxpayers received a jury award for the personal
injuries and the state court added statutory delay damages
determined by applying an interest rate to the jury award over
the time between the filing of the suit and the jury award.
During the appeal process, the parties reached a settlement
which was not much less than the total state court award. The
court found that the delay damages were very similar to pre-
judgment interest. The court held that the delay damages were
included in the taxpayers’ income because the purposes of the
delay damages was to compensate the taxpayers for the loss of
the use of the jury award during the lawsuit. The court delayed
ruling on the proper allocation of the settlement between
personal injury compensation and delay damages pending
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presentation of evidence and arguments on the allocation issue.
Francisco v. United States, 99-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶
50,625 (E.D. Penn. 1999).
DEDUCTIONS. The court disallowed a portion of the
taxpayers’ claimed charitable and miscellaneous deductions
because the taxpayer failed to present any evidence to
substantiate the expenses. Muhsin v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo.
1999-215.
DISASTER PAYMENTS . On May 21, 1999, the president
determined that certain areas in Iowa are eligible for assistance
under the Act as a result of severe storms, flooding and
tornadoes beginning on May 16, 1999 (FEMA-1277-DR).
Black Hawk, Bremer, Buchanan, Butler, Clayton, Clinton,
Crawford, Delaware, Dubuque, Fayette, Harrison, Jones, Linn
and Scott. The president on May 28, 1999, determined that
certain areas in Jo Daviess County in Illinois are eligible for
assistance under the Act as a result of severe storms and flash
flooding beginning on May 16, 1999 (FEMA-1278-DR).
Taxpayers in these areas who sustained losses attributable to the
disaster may deduct them on their 1998 returns.
HOBBY LOSSES. The taxpayer was employed as a district
sales manager of an insurance company with substantial
income. The taxpayer purchased 5, 40 and 120 acre parcels for
the construction of a residence and for use in fish farming,
harvesting timberland, and growing row crops and Christmas
trees. The taxpayer placed some of the land in government
subsidy programs, received government disaster payments and
made depreciable improvements to the land. The taxpayer
reported losses from the farming activities for all seven tax
years since the purchase of the property. Due to equipment
failure, the fish farming activity produced only minimal sales of
fish and the loss of most of the fish. At the time of the trial, no
fish were being raised while a wind powered system was being
installed. The Christmas tree operation had not yet produced
any salable trees but the taxpayer estimated that sales would
begin within two years after the trial. Although the taxpayer had
begun some management of the timberland, no trees had yet
been cut for sale. The taxpayer hired a local farmer to raise row
crops on a small portion of the larger tract and enrolled 14 acres
of the 40 acre tract in the federal CRP. The Tax Court first held
that all of the taxpayer’s activities on the rural land would be
considered as one activity for purposes of the hobby loss
provisions. The court then held that the taxpayer did not operate
the farming business with an intent to make a profit, based on
the following factors. (1) The taxpayer kept separate records for
the business through an accountant but the taxpayer did not
present the records into evidence, several checks were made for
personal expenses and the books were not well organized. (2)
The taxpayer did not expend much time on the farm other than
that which contributed to the personal pleasure from rural life.
The row crops were produced by an independent contractor. (3)
The taxpayer failed to provide sufficient evidence that the land
and business assets would appreciate in value. (4) The business
had losses in all years of operation. (5) The taxpayer had
substantial income from other sources which would be offset by
the losses. (6) The taxpayer had not had past success with
similar activities or much experience at the farming activities
attempted. (7) The taxpayer and family derived personal and
recreational pleasure from the activities. The appellate court
reversed, holding that (1) the taxpayers’ records were sufficient
in that the taxpayers, their accountant and the IRS had been
able to d termine the taxpayers’ profits and losses; (2) the
taxpayers spent considerable and tenacious efforts to make the
farm profitable; (3) the taxpayers demonstrated an honest
expectation of appreciation of assets; (4) the losses resulted
from unexpected adverse weather and animal damage; (5)
although the taxpayers had substantial other income, the losses
were actual out-of-pocket losses and not paper losses; (6) the
record showed that the taxpayers had a record of successful
business endeavors; and (7) the personal pleasure activities
often were undertaken to protect the business, such as deer
hunting to remove crop-eating deer. Holmes V. Comm’r, 99-2
U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶ 50,642 (6th Cir. 1999), rev’g, T.C.
Memo. 1997-401.
LIKE-KIND EXCHANGES . The taxpayer owned a one-half
int rest in 39,000 acres of timberland with the other half
interest owned by a corporation. The majority of the
corporation was owned by the taxpayer’s son. Because of a
disagreement as to the use of the timberland, the parties agreed
to exchang  a portion of each’s half interest such that each
would solely own an equal number of acres. The corporation
then planned to harvest and sell the timber and the taxpayer
planned to retain the timberland as an investment. The IRS
ruled that the exchange would qualify as a like-kind exchange
and that the corporation’s disposition of the timberland would
have no effect on the like-kind exchange treatment of the
exchange. Ltr. Rul. 9926045, April 2, 1999.
LOSSES. The taxpayer was a corporation which purchased
property from a major shareholder at an arm's-length, fair-
market-value price. The shareholder owned more than 50
percent of the value of the stock in the corporation. The
purchase price was paid to the shareholder in the form of an
annuity, using the annuity tables contained in the predecessor
regulations to Treas. Reg. §20.2031-7. Thereafter, the taxpayer
sold the property to unrelated third parties at a price equivalent
to the fair market value of the property. The major shareholder
was still alive when the property was sold. The taxpayer
r cognized no gain or loss on the sale. Annuity payments were
made to the shareholder until the taxpayer decided to terminate
the annuity by making a payment to the shareholder of the
present value of the remaining annuity payments. The total
payments made under the annuity contract, including the final
payment, exceeded the sales price of the property to the
unrelat d third parties. In accordance with Rev. Rul. 55-119,
1955-1 C.B. 352, which applies to taxpayers not engaged in the
business of writing annuities (which is the case here), the
taxpayer took a capital loss deduction on its return for the year
of the annuity buyout. In a field service advice, the IRS ruled
that the loss deduction was allowed. The IRS also ruled that
I.R.C. § 267(a) did not prevent recognition of the loss because
no loss was claimed when the annuity was purchased. FSA Ltr.
Rul. 9925039, April 1, 1999.
PARTNERSHIPS-ALM  § 7.02[3][c].*
ADMINISTRATIVE ADJUSTMENTS. The court held that a
partnership was not subject to the TEFRA partnership
administrative adjustment procedures because the partnership
had only two partners and each partner had the same share of
partnership tax items. Dhillon v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 1999-
214.
PENSION PLANS . The taxpayers were teachers who owned
interests i  a retirement fund. The school district started a new
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retirement program and encouraged the taxpayers to change to
the new fund. The taxpayers received all the money in the old
fund and transferred the money to the new program. In a
decision designated as not for publication, the court held that
the funds were subject to the 15 percent excise tax of I.R.C. §
4980A(a). Scallion v. United States, 99-2 U.S. Tax Cas.
(CCH) ¶ 50,644 (4th Cir. 1999), aff’g, 98-1 U.S. Tax Cas.
(CCH) ¶ 50,284 (D. Md. 1998).
RENTAL PROPERTY . The taxpayers purchased a building
which was used for six residential apartments. The court found
that the taxpayers terminated all of the leases in 1993 and began
renovation of the entire building for use as their residence. The
court disallowed depreciation and other deductions associated
with the maintenance of the building for 1994 and 1995
because the building was not held for a trade or business use
after termination of the leases. Towles v. Comm’r, T.C.
Memo. 1999-223.
RETURNS. The IRS has announced that approximately 2.2
million taxpayers who received vouchers for Form 1040-ES,
Estimated Tax for Individuals, in late May, received misprinted
versions. The second quarter forms should have had the due
date of June 15, 1999 and the fourth quarter forms should have
the due date of January 18, 2000. Second quarter payments with
postmarks of June 16, 1999 will be accepted as timely filed.
S CORPORATIONS-ALM § 7.02[3][c].*
DISCHARGE OF INDEBTEDNESS. The taxpayer was a
shareholder in an S corporation which was a partner in a joint
venture which realized discharge of indebtedness income in
1991. The taxpayer increased the basis of the taxpayer’s S
corporation stock by the taxpayer’s share of the discharge of
indebtedness income passed through the S corporation. At the
time of the discharge of the indebtedness, the S corporation was
insolvent and had net operating losses. The increase in the stock
basis enabled the taxpayer to deduct the carried-over losses in a
later year. The IRS argued that the discharge of indebtedness
income was not an item of income for purposes of determining
stock basis because discharge of indebtedness income was
excluded under the insolvency exclusion rule of I.R.C. § 108.
The Tax Court held that, because the corporation was insolvent,
I.R.C. § 108 caused an exclusion of the discharge of
indebtedness income at the corporation level which was offset
by reduction in tax attributes of the corporation, leaving no tax
consequences to flow to the shareholders such as would
increase the shareholders’ basis in stock. Gitlitz v. United
States, 99-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶ 50,645 (10th Cir. 1999),
aff’g sub nom., Winn v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 1998-71,
withdrawing T.C. Memo. 1997-286; Nelson v. Comm’r, 99-2
U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶ 50,646 (10th Cir. 1999), aff’g, 110
T.C. 114 (1998).
SELF-EMPLOYMENT TAX . The taxpayer operated a retail
store and created inventions in the taxpayer’s spare time. The
taxpayer received a patent for a microwave product. The
taxpayer sued two companies for infringement of the patent and
received settlement payments and licensing agreements. The
taxpayer argued that the settlements and licensing fees were not
self-employment income because the taxpayer was not in the
business of inventing. The court held that the taxpayer was not
in the business or trade of inventing because the taxpayer did
not develop or design inventions on a continuous or regular
basis; therefore, the payments were not self-employment
income.Levinson v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 1999-212.
TAX LIENS . The IRS has issued proposed regulations
providing that a district director, the director of a service center
or the Assistant Commissioner (International) (the director)
may withdraw a notice of federal tax lien if the director
determines that (1) the filing of the notice of federal tax lien
was premature or otherwise not in accordance with the
administrative procedures of the Secretary; (2) the taxpayer has
entered into an agreement under section 6159 to satisfy the
liability for which the lien was imposed by means of
in tallment payments, unless the agreement by its terms
provides that the notice will not be withdrawn; (3) the
withdrawal of notice will facilitate collection of the tax liability
for which the lien was imposed; or (4) the withdrawal of notice
would be in the best interest of the taxpayer, as determined by
the National Taxpayer Advocate, and in the best interest of the
United States, as determined by the director. The notice of
federal tax lien is withdrawn by filing a notice of withdrawal in
the office in which the notice of federal tax lien is filed and
providing the taxpayer with a copy of the notice. Following the
withdrawal of a notice of federal tax lien, chapter 64 of subtitle
F, relating to collection, is applied as if the IRS had never filed
a notice of federal tax lien. The withdrawal of a notice of
federal tax lien does not affect the underlying tax lien. The
withdrawal simply relinquishes any lien priority the IRS had
obtained under I.R.C. § 6323 when the IRS filed the notice
being withdrawn. 64 Fed. Reg. 35102 (June 30, 1999).
TRUSTS. The taxpayer was a limited partner in a real estate
investment trust (REIT) which owned timberland. The
partnership entered into timber cutting contracts with third
parties to cut, harvest and sell the timber. The partnership
would retain an economic interest in the timber under the
agreements and would have passive income from the proceeds
of the agreements. The partnership did not cut, harvest or
merchandise any of the timber. The partnership alleged that the
income from the agreements would qualify under I.R.C. §
631(b). The IRS ruled that, provided that the timber cutting
agreements entered into by the partnership were governed by §
631(b), the gross income derived from the disposal of timber
pursuant to the cutting agreements would constitute gross
income derived from gain from the sale or disposition of real
property (or interests in real property) which is not property
described in I.R.C. § 1221(1), for purposes of I.R.C. §§
856(c)(2)(D) and 856(c)(3)(C). Also, such income would not be
treated as prohibited transaction income under I.R.C. §
857(b)(6) which imposes a 100 percent tax on a REIT for such
transactions. Ltr. Rul. 925015, March 19, 1999.
LANDLORD AND TENANT
IMPROVEMENTS . The plaintiff had orally leased land on a
year-to-year basis from the defendants in exchange for one-
sixth of the proceeds of the sugarcane crops grown on the land.
The only other lease term agreed to was for the plaintiff to
purchase a certain percentage of supplies from one of the
defendants. In 1989, the defendant notified the plaintiff that the
lease would not be renewed the next year and that the plaintiff
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could remove improvements so long as the land was returned to
its former condition. The plaintiff sued for reimbursement for
the remaining sugarcane plants and stubble. The defendants
sought offset for the amount of sugarcane plants and stubble
which were on the land when the leases began. The court found
that no evidence was presented as to the amount of plants and
stubble on the land at commencement of the leases. The court
held that the defendants were not entitled to offset for the value
of improvements on the land at commencement of the leases
because the leases contained no provision for such offset. The
defendants also argued that La. Civil Code art. 493 limited the
plaintiff to recovery only for plantings made within 90 days
before the defendants’ demand for the plaintiff to remove
improvements from the property. The court held that the
defendants’ termination notice was not a demand under the
statute; therefore, the plaintiff was entitled to compensation for
all plant and stubble on the land. The court noted that the
defendants leased the land to another sugarcane grower who
used the remaining plant and stubble to grow more sugarcane,
demonstrating the value of the remaining improvements to the
defendants. Caballero Planting Co., Inc. v. Hymel, 713 So.2d
1277 (La. Ct. App. 1998).
PARTNERSHIPS
DEFINITION . In 1968, two brothers executed a written
partnership agreement for the operation of a ranch for ten years.
However, the ranch was never formally run as a partnership and
no change in the operation occurred at the end of the ten years
until the death of one brother. The surviving brother had
claimed all of the ranch losses on tax returns and had made
references to the ranch as owned by him and the other brother
as the hired man. The court held that the partnership agreement
and testimony of the surviving brother demonstrated that the
ranch was operated as a partnership, entitling the decedent’s
estate to one-half of the partnership assets. In re Estate of
Bolinger, 971 P.2d 767 (Mont. 1998).
PRODUCT LIABILITY
PESTICIDE . The plaintiff purchased a pesticide for the
control of weevils in stored peas. The pesticide was
manufactured by the defendant. The plaintiff sought recovery in
breach of express and implied warranty from statements on the
package labels, and manuals and for negligent oral
misrepresentations by the defendant’s employees. The court
held that the breach of warranty claims were preempted by
FIFRA because the claims arose from information on the
product’s labels. The plaintiff had plead two kinds of oral
representations by the defendant’s employees. The first
involved statements which reiterated the information on the
product label. The second set of representations involved
information comparing the product to other products. The court
held that the first oral representations were not actionable
because they involved information on the product label and
were preempted by FIFRA. However, the court held that the
claim arising from the second set of oral representations
involving comparison of the product to other products was not
preempted by FIFRA because the comparative representations
involved information not found on the label and were
voluntarily made for commercial advantage. M & H
Enterprises v. Tri State Delta Chemicals, Inc., 984 S.W. 2d
175 (Mo. Ct. App. 1998).
SECURED TRANSACTIONS
ATTACHMENT . The plaintiff was a farm equipment dealer
which entered into an installment contract for sale of a
combine. The person who negotiated the contract was not the
buy r and forged the signature of the buyer on the agreement in
order to obtain possession of the combine. The forger then
borrowed money from the defendant, using the combine as
coll teral. The defendant repossessed the combine when the
forger failed to make payments on the loan. The plaintiff sued
for conversion, claiming a priority interest in the combine. The
defendant claimed a priority security interest as a good faith
purchaser. The court held that the forger’s interest in the
combine was void, not voidable; therefore, the forger had no
property rights in the combine because of the forgery. Because
the forger had no property rights in the combine, the
defendant’s security interest could not attach to any interest of
the forger in the combine. The court held that, because the
plaintiff’s title was never conveyed, the plaintiff retained title to
the combine. Moore Equipment Co. v. Halferty, 980 S.W.2d
578 (Mo. Ct. App. W.D. 1998).
FEDERAL FARM PRODUCTS RULE . The plaintiff had
loaned money to a cotton producer and obtained a security
interest in the cotton grown by the producer. The plaintiff
provided notice of the security interest to the defendant cotton
brokerage. The producer delivered the cotton to the brokerage
warehouse which issued electronic warehouse receipts which
were sold to several cotton merchants. The security agreement
prohibited the delivery of the cotton to a warehouse without
prior permission of the plaintiff. The plaintiff sued the
brokerage and cotton merchants for conversion, alleging a
priority security interest under the federal farm products lien
rule. The court held that the plaintiff had fully complied with
the federal farm products rule requirements. The defendants
argued that the U.S. Warehouse Act, 7 U.S.C. § 259, preempted
the federal farm products rule where an electronic warehouse
receipt has been issued. The court held that, although the
Warehouse Act did provide for a priority scheme, the Act did
not exclude application of other federal and state law
concerning priority of security interests; therefore, the Act did
not preempt the federal farm products rule. The defendants also
argued that the plaintiff had acquiesced in the delivery of the
cotton to the warehouse, but the court held that insufficient
evidence existed to grant the defendants a summary judgment
on that issue. Agricredit Acceptance, LLC. v. Hendrix, 32 F.
Supp.2d 1361 (S.D. Ga. 1998).
CITATION UPDATES
In re St. Francis, 232 B.R. 518 (Bankr. N.D. GA. 1999)
(sale of residence) see p. 75 supra.
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The Agricultural Law Press and the Montana Society of CPAs present
“SEMINAR IN THE ROCKIES”
AGRICULTURAL TAX AND LAW SEMINAR
by Neil E. Harl and Roger A. McEowen
August 4-6, 1999 Rock Creek Resort, Red Lodge Montana
Come join us in the clear, wild mountain air of the Montana Rocky Mountains for a world-class seminar on the hottest topics in agricultural tax
and law. Space is limited for this wonderful opportunity to gain expert insight into agricultural law and enjoy the splendor of one of America’s
greatest natural wonders.
The seminar will be Wednesday, Thursday, and Friday, August 4-6, 1999 at the Rock Creek Lodge, near Red Lodge located in the heart of the
magnificent Montana Rockies. Registrants may attend one, two or all three days, with separate pricing for each combination. On Wednesday, Dr.
Harl will speak about farm and ranch income tax. On Thursday, Dr. Harl and Roger McEowen will cover farm and ranch estate planning. On
Friday, Roger McEowen will cover current developments in all other areas of agricultural law. Your registration fee includes a copy of Dr. Neil
Harl's seminar manuals, F rm Income Tax (almost 300 pages) and F rm Estate and Business Planning: Annotated Materials  (nea ly 500 pages)
and a copy of Roger McEowen’s seminar materials, all of which will be updated prior to the seminar. The seminar materials will also be available
on CD-ROM for a small additional charge. Continental buffet breakfasts and break refreshments are also included in the registration fee.
Special room discounts are available for all rooms at the Rock Creek Resort. The resort is located 60 miles south of Logan International Airport
in Billings, MT and 60 miles north of Yellowstone Regional Airport in Cody, WY.
The seminar registration fees for current subscribers to the Agricultural Law Digest, the Agricultural Law Manual, or Principles of Agricultural
Law and members of the MSCPAs are $175 (one day), $350 (two days) and $500 (three days).  The registration fees for nonsubscribers and
nonmembers are $195, $380 and $560 respectively.
There is still plenty of room, but hurry, time is running short.
*       *       *       *
Whether or not you can make it to the Montana seminar, check out our next seminar:
The Agricultural Law Press presents the 4th Annual “Seminar In Paradise”
FARM ESTATE AND BUSINESS PLANNING SEMINAR
by Neil E. Harl and Roger A. McEowen
January 24-28, 2000 Royal Lahaina Resort, Island of Maui, Hawai’i
Spend a week in Hawai'i in January 2000! Balmy trade winds, 70-80 degrees, palm trees, white sand beaches and the rest of paradise can be
yours; plus a world-class seminar on Farm Estate and Business Planning by Dr. Neil E. Harl and Prof. Roger A. McEowen.  The seminar is
scheduled for January 24-28, 2000 at the spectacular ocean-front Royal Lahaina Resort on the Island of Maui, Hawai'i.
Seminar sessions run from 8:00 a.m. to 12:00 p.m. each day, Monday through Friday, with a continental breakfast and break refreshments
included in the registration fee. That is 20 hours of practical instruction in the most important areas of agricultural estate and business planning.
Each participant will receive a copy of Dr. Harl's 500 page seminar manual, Farm Estate and Business Planning: Annotated Materials,which
will be updated just prior to the seminar. A CD-ROM version will also be available for a small additional charge.
Attendees are eligible for substantial discounts on hotel rooms at the Royal Lahaina Resort, the site of the seminar.
The seminar registration fee is $645 for current subscribers to the Agricul ural Law Digest, the Agricultural Law Manual, or Principles of
Agricultural Law. The registration fee for nonsubscribers is $695.
Call/fax Robert Achenbach at 1-541-302-1958 or e-mail: aglaw@aol.com, if you need a brochure for either seminar.
Also, see our web site for details and registration forms:
http://members.aol.com/aglaw/agpub
